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I. INTRODUCTION
The summer preceding the 2004 presidential election has come to be known
as the "summer of 527s," a reference to the ubiquity during the election of
independent political organizations established under § 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' Section 527 organizations are tax-exempt, operate independently of political
parties and their candidates, and seek to influence federal elections short of the
outright endorsement of the election or defeat of a candidate.: Unregulated in the
amounts and sources of the contributions they can receive, those organizations came
to be personified by billionaires like George Soros, who used the § 527 vehicle to
infuse millions of dollars into the 2004 election.'
If 527 organizations owned the summer, then the fall proved to be the autumn
of discontent for community-based civil rights organizations, which traditionally
played instrumental roles in voter registration and get out the vote (GOTV) drives
in federal campaigns prior to the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA).4 BCRA banned soft, or unregulated, money in federal elections5
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., Brown University; J.D., New
York University School of Law. Copyright 2006.
1. See Victoria S. Shabo, Comment, "Money, Like Water... ": Revisiting Equality in Campaign
Finance Regulation After the 2004 "Summer of 52 7s," 84 N.C. L. REv. 221,224 (2005); I.R.C. § 527
(2000).
2. I.R.C. § 527.
3. Shabo, supra note 1, at 224-26.
4. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (Supp. 2003)).
5. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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but vanquished a key source of funding for these groups in the process.6 527
organizations attempted to fill the void, not by supplying funding to these local
grassroots organizations, but rather by undertaking their erstwhile functions.7 The
perceived usurpation of 527 organizations on the traditional role of minority
grassroots organizations prompted University of Maryland political scientist Ron
Walters to remark, "[W]e're not putting the resources into the hands of those who
can mobilize the Black vote .... They're making some serious errors with these
resources by not connecting up to the people who can move this full apparatus.
This is another form of colonialism-colonialism is about control."
8
The pique of local civil rights organizations over resources for voter
mobilization was symptomatic of a larger overhang left by BCRA for voters of
color (though not exclusively for those voters): BCRA left minority candidates,
voters, and issues as unequal as ever.9 Although new reforms such as expenditure
limitations and public financing are afoot and portend a better reckoning with
equality concerns, the experience under BCRA highlights a truth that spoke even
before BCRA's enactment: minority political empowerment-whether from the
standpoint of the election of minority candidates, GOTV, or the engagement of
minority concerns during elections-has long been too dependent on white money.
The minority voting rights movement, under continuing attack from Shaw v.
Reno"° and facing the challenge of re-authorization of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, " has yet to rectify this troubling paradox of its movement. The
movement's focus on autonomy-the election of minority candidates without
dependence upon white votes-is difficult to reconcile with minority candidates'
reliance on white dollars to finance their campaigns. No less contradictory is the
effort to evaluate all candidates' commitment to a minority-supported agenda when
that agenda is often silenced during the campaign because of candidates'
preoccupation with the median voter and the relative paucity of independent
expenditures devoted to minority issues. The common refrain to these observations
is the plea of inequality: those who have less give less and are heard less.' 2 I think
this argument is indisputable and that inequality will persist in the absence of
6. Brian DeBose, Black Caucus Retreats on 527s Reforms, WASH. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at AO1.
7. Id.
8. Hazel Trice Edney, "Arrogant" White Liberals Seek to Manage Black Voter Turnout, S.F.
BAY VIEW, Sept. 29, 2004, http://www.sfbayview.com/092904/arrogantwhiteliberalsO92904.shtml.
9. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
10. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
12. See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 74 (2004) (arguing that opponents of campaign finance reform "largely overlook
the structural impact of vast disparities in wealth on the ability of most citizens to make financial
contributions"); see also Antonio Gonzalez & Stephanie Moore, Wealthy Campaign Donors Stifle
Minority Voices, USA TODAY, Dec. 11,2003, at 23A ("Because the system implicitly relies on an elite
group of wealthy, white donors to fund most campaigns, it discriminates against people of color and
other underserved communities that don't cough up as much money.").
[Vol. 57: 735
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reforms such as expenditure limitations and public financing. Inequality and
agency, however, can and do exist simultaneously in campaign finance law. A type
of agency, in the representation or virtual representation sense, exists in minority
voters' reliance on candidates supported but not funded by them to represent their
interests. Yet a different kind of agency, agency that focuses on minority voters'
capacity for self-help and independent action, has been largely unrealized. One
reason agency in the empowering sense is so lacking is that minority voters have
failed to critically assess their relationship with consumerism, which enriches
political opponents by diverting resources to corporations and their owners that
could otherwise be invested in minority voters' own political capital. What is
needed is a mass re-orientation of thought regarding the worth of politics and the
perils of disengagement. The gravamen of this re-education project must be the
exhortation that politics has consequences for the everyday lives of people of color
and should therefore be part of the bundle of goods to which their spending power
is directed.
Part II discusses the financial dependence of minority candidates on white
political contributions and the extent to which this relationship negatively impacts
minority political autonomy. In addition, this Part focuses on how the absence of
minority dollars from the campaign finance system-whether in the form of
candidate contributions or independent expenditures-corresponds to the absence
of discussion of minority issues. Part II discusses BCRA's failure to address the
core concerns raised in Part 1H and how other initiatives such as public financing of
campaigns might better, though still imperfectly, address these concerns.
Regardless of whether more promising campaign finance initiatives are realized, the
need for minority voters to exercise agency will remain. Part IV discusses that
need. In so doing, I observe that minority consumerism has the ironic and circular
effect of empowering anti-minority interests in the political marketplace. At the
same time, containment and a rethinking of consumerism is the possible source of
minority agency under campaign finance law. Part V provides a conclusion.
II. CAN WHITE MONEY FUND MNoRrrY POLITICAL AUTONOMY?
The extent of minority voters' campaign giving is under-studied. Yet there is
substantial evidence of minority invisibility. 3 During the 2000 election cycle, a
mere thirty zip codes gave twenty or more contributions to black candidates. 4 Of
those thirty zip codes, only six were majority black.'5 In the 2004 election cycle,
predominantly black zip codes contributed only 2.7 percent of the federal campaign
13. See Robert Moore, Black Candidates See Little of the Millions Their Parties Raise, THE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITy, Sept. 15, 2000, http://www.publicintegrity.org (search "site Search"
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contributions of $200 or more, 16 yet blacks constitute 1 percent of the Senate and
9 percent of the House of Representatives.17 Predominantly Latino zip codes
contributed only 2.2 percent of the federal campaign contributions of $200 or
more, 18 yet Latinos constitute 2 percent of the Senate and 5 percent of the House of
Representatives.' 9 Non-Latino white zip codes provided 89.1 percent of federal
campaign contributions of $200 or more during the 2004 election cycle. 2° Non-
whites constitute 24.8 percent of the United States population.2' Minority voters
thus do not appear to be financing the campaigns of minority candidates.
All major 2004 presidential candidates raised the bulk of their individual
contributions of more than $200 from majority non-Latino, white neighborhoods.22
This means the two African American candidates, Carol Moseley Braun and
Reverend Al Sharpton, both raised most of their campaign funds from white
neighborhoods.2 ' Although the 2004 presidential contest marked a watershed in the
rate of giving by small donors (those contributing $100 or less), 4 there is no
evidence that voters of color participated in this up-tick in small donor participation.
Indeed, a recent Institute for Politics, Democracy & the Intemet report on the
increase in contributions by small donors during the 2004 presidential election
provided demographic data on income, education, age, gender and religious
faith-but not race.25 Nevertheless, the data presented suggests voters of color were
not participants in this phenomenon, for "[t]he small donors stand somewhere
between large donors and the general public in many respects. Small donors were
neither as wealthy nor as highly educated as large donors, although they were more
wealthy and educated than the general population. '26 Given the socioeconomic
16. PUBLIC CAMPAIGN ET AL., COLOR OFMONEY: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, RACE, ETHNICITY,
AND NEIGHBORHOODS (2004), http://www.colorofmoney.org (follow "2004 Presidential Race"
hyperlink; then click "Overall Federal Campaign Contribution Data"; press "Go") [hereinafter COLOR
OF MONEY NATIONAL OVERVIEW].
17. African, Hispanic (Latino), and Asian American Members of Congress, ETHNIC MAJORITY,
http://www.ethnicmajority.com/congress.htm (last visited Apr. 5,2006) [hereinafter Minority Members
of Congress].
18. COLOR OF MONEY NATIONAL OVERVIEW, supra note 16.
19. Minority Members of Congress, supra note 17.
20. COLOR OF MONEY NATIONAL OVERVIEW, supra note 16.
21. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE POPULATION PROFILEOFTHE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 2-2 tbl.2-1
(2001), http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/profile2000.pdf.
22. PUBLIC CAMPAIGN ET AL., COLOR OF MONEY: THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL RACE 3 (2004),
available at http://www.colorofmoney.org/report/2004-cofm-pres-complete.pdf [hereinafter COLOR
OF MONEY REPORT].
23. Id.
24. INSTITUTE FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY & THE INTERNET, SMALL DONORS AND ONLINE GIVING
1(2006), available at http://www.ipdi.orgfUploadedFiles/Small percent20Donors percent20Report.pdf.
25. Id. at 11-16.
26. Id. at 16-17. This conclusion is consistent with available data from the 2000 presidential
primaries that demonstrated people of color were "grossly underrepresented" in the $100-or-less
contribution category. See Overton, supra note 12, at 118 n. 162.
[Vol. 57: 735
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indicators that portray blacks and Latinos as lagging the general public,27 it is a fair
inference that the new small donor class is disproportionately white.
The only published analysis that suggests black candidates raised most of their
funds from black constituents focused on local elections in North Carolina. The
study examined elections in Charlotte and Mecklenburg County from 1975 to 1980,
finding black Democrats constituted 89 percent of the contributors to black
Democratic candidates.28 However, the study did not indicate that the majority of
those candidates' campaign funds came from black contributors.29
The absence of proportionate or substantial minority monetary support for
candidates of color is a double bind for the latter because candidates of color are
generally under-financed relative to white candidates.3" Thus, candidates of color
are dependent on white dollars in an overall context of inequality. A principal
schism in the campaign finance reform debate has been over whether money buys
influence. On the one hand, there are former Federal Elections Commission
Chairman Bradley Smith's repeated assertions that "[t]he plain and simple fact is
that research shows, over and over, that campaign contributions just aren't that
important."'" On the other hand, there is the Supreme Court's thorough refutation
of Smith's academic perspective in McConnell v. FEC,3 2 which relied on the
experience of legislators themselves in upholding key provisions of BCRA against
constitutional attack.33 But if we accept McConnell's premise that money purchases
access to candidates and influence,34 what then is the relationship among black
candidates, elected representatives, and the primarily white dollars that fund their
campaigns?
Professor Lani Guinier suggests that we can no more assume the authenticity
of black representatives under these circumstances than we could if those
representatives were elected from a majority-white district.35  While Professor
27. See infra notes 71-76.
28. Theodore S. Arrington & Gerald L. Ingalls, Race and Campaign Finance in Charlotte, N.C.,
37 W. POL. Q. 578, 579-80 (1984).
29. Id. at 580.
30. See JOHN THEILMANN & AL WILHITE, DISCRIMINATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS 77-78 (1991) (examining congressional races during the 1980s and concluding that
incumbent black representatives received significantly lower large contributions from individual donors
than did white incumbents in three of five election cycles); National Institute on Money in State
Politics, State at a Glance: Georgia State Senate 1992, Summary of Campaign Funding Patterns,
Georgia State Senate 1992, 1994, 1996 (www.followthemoney.org) (noting funding advantages by
white candidates of 73 percent, 16 percent and 106 percent for each of the election cycles).
31. Bradley A. Smith, Regulation and the Decline of Grassroots Politics, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.
1, 9 (2000). Smith cites two studies from the 1980s in support of this assertion. See id. at 9 n.25.
32. 540 U.S. 93, 125, 146-52 (2003).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Cf. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1108-09 (1991) ("Electoral success by culturally and
ethnically black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions does not necessarily mean that black
concerns will be addressed. For example, where 'authentic blacks' are elected by whites with
20061
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Guinier's focus was the color of the votes cast for black candidates, the critical
question is whether there is equal reason to suspect less authentic minority
representation when the minority candidate must substantially depend on whites to
finance his campaign.
We are handicapped in this inquiry by the lack of scholarly attention afforded
the effects of campaign finance laws on minority candidates, representatives, and
voters. 36 Nevertheless, Congress's passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 200537 and other legislation thought to be inimical
to minority interests may offer some cautionary insights. According to the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, black and Latino homeowners are 500
percent more likely to file bankruptcy than whites. 38 That venerable civil rights
organization opposed the bankruptcy bill, which, among other punitive changes,
created a presumption of abuse of bankruptcy if the debtor's income exceeds a
specified threshold. 39 However, ten members of the forty-one member
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) voted in favor of the legislation.4° Several of
the ten defectors are heavily funded by and otherwise connected with business
interests. For instance, Representative Artur Davis of Alabama, who hails from
the poorest district among caucus members, collected 75 percent of the monies he
spent in his 2004 primary from business interests. Similarly, Representative David
Scott of Georgia received 61.1 percent of his 2005-2006 funding from political
action committees (PACs); 84.9 percent of the PAC money came from business
PACs.
43
significant black support, electoral ratification by a majority of those blacks voting may not in fact send
a recognizable message regarding substantive policies. Especially in winner-take-all electoral systems,
'the aggregation device of the election garbles these messages, producing winners while obscuring the
reasons for their victories.' Thus, even where black support provides a critical margin, successful black
candidates in majority-white electorates do note necessarily feel obligated to black voters." (quoting
Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up ": Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 487 (1988))).
36. Even election law textbooks purporting to survey the area of campaign finance accord little
or no treatment of the subject. See SAMUELISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN&RICHARDH. PILDES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 450-543 (rev. 2d ed.
2002); DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
717-1024 (3d ed. 2004). Undoubtedly, the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in the authorship of these
and other works contributes to a lack of intellectual diversity.
37. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
38. Kanya Simon, Blacks Could Feel Brunt of New Bankruptcy Law, CAPITAL OU'TLOOK, Apr.
14-Apr. 50, 2005, at 1-2.
39. Id.
40. Black Caucus Conservatives Attempt to Clone Themselves, BLACKCOMMENTATOR, May 12,




43. The Center for Responsive Politics, David Scott: Campaign Finance/Money,
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Scott is one of four caucus members who not only voted in favor of the
bankruptcy legislation but also for two other issues-repeal of the estate tax and
energy legislation-that were either antithetical to black interests or almost
exclusively beneficial to wealthy white interests. 4 Davis voted for two of the
three.45 Only a fraction of one percent of blacks stand to benefit from repeal of the
estate tax, and the recently passed energy legislation provided massive subsidies to
the oil industry.46 Davis and the Black Caucus members who aligned on
bankruptcy, the estate tax, and the energy bill share a similar fund raising profile:
a significant source of their campaign funds come from business interests.47
The concern over the influence of money in politics has not been limited to quid
pro quo corruption,48 and nor should concerns be so limited in examining the
relationship of politicians of color to white money. If the appearance of corruption
can serve as a constitutional basis for regulating contributions and banning soft
money,49 then "inauthentic" voting behavior by politicians of color who receive
significant campaign funds from white interests is a legitimate basis for at least
questioning whether white largesse can finance minority political autonomy.
The preeminence of 527 organizations in the 2004 campaign and the soft
money expenditures in campaigns prior to 2004 amply demonstrate that candidate
campaign finance and speech is but one dimension of the election process. Voters
of color are no more visible in these alternate realms than they are in candidate
contributions. The effect of their absence is compounding. White candidates who
must rely on black support soft-pedal black issues during the course of a campaign
in order to court median or swing voters.50 Thus, minority issues are often only
addressed in passing by white candidates rather than as a centerpiece of their
44. See Black Caucus Conservatives, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. How to Fix the Fractured Black Caucus, BLACK COMMENTATOR, Apr. 58, 2005,
http://www.blackcommentator.com/136/136_coverblackcaucus.html.
47. See Black Caucus Conservatives, supra note 40; Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Total Raised
and Spent, 2006 Race: Georgia District 2: Sanford Bishop, http://www.opensecrets.org/races/
summary.asp?LD=GA02&Cycle=2006 (last visited May 1, 2006); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Total
Raised and Spent, 2006 Race: Alabama District 7: Artur Davis,http://www.opensecrets.org/races/
summary.asp?ID=AL07&Cycle=2006 (last visited May 1, 2006); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Total
Raised and Spent, 2006 Race: Louisiana District 2: William Jefferson, http://www.opensecrets.org/
races/summary.aspID=GA02&Cycle=2006 (last visited May 1, 2006); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Total Raised and Spent, 2006 Race: Georgia District 13: David Scott, http://www.opensecrets.org/
races/summary.asp?ID=GAl 3&Cycle=2006 (last visited May 1, 2006); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Total Raised and Spent, 2006 Race: Maryland District 4: Albert Wynn, http://www.opensecrets.org/
races/summary.asp?ID=MD04&Cycle=2006 (last visited May 1, 2006).
48. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003) (describing the interests that justify
contribution limitations as preventing both "'actual corruption"' and "'the eroding of public confidence
in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.' (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work,
459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982))).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1515-16 (2001)
(citing the 2000 Gore presidential campaign as an example).
20061
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campaigns. Prior to BCRA's ban of party soft money, this money was likewise not
usually devoted to campaign messages aimed at minority communities.5
Expenditures by interest groups unaffiliated with parties or candidates, whether 527
organizations or other tax-exempt groups, have not been directed at minority voters
to any significant degree except for purposes of registering and turning these voters
out on election day. The one notable exception during the past two presidential
elections to the focus of third-party interest group advertising was an issue-ad the
NAACP National Voter Fund ran during the 2000 election. The ad attacked then-
Governor George W. Bush for his opposition to hate-crimes legislation in Texas.52
However, the NAACP financed the ad with a $10 million donation by an
anonymous individual53 who was widely rumored to be non-black.54
With so little money devoted and so little heed paid to minority concerns during
the course of national campaigns, it is little wonder that even candidates thought to
be favorably predisposed to minority interests produce policies that are not in the
interest of minorities, such as President Clinton's welfare reform compromise.55
Blacks and Latinos should continue to brace themselves for such betrayals, for
"substantive action on the major concerns of black Americans is only possible if the
electorate at large is convinced of their importance and legitimacy-an improbable
outcome if these issues are shunted to narrow venues in the national discourse of
a presidential campaign."56
III. THE NEGLECT OF REFORM-PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
BCRA's objective was to ban soft money from federal elections. Soft money
is the unregulated funds donated by wealthy individuals, corporate donors, and
labor unions and used by political parties and interest groups primarily on so-called
issue advocacy advertisements.57 The Supreme Court upheld that central objective
51. Id. (noting the Democratic Party's soft-money television buys largely tracked the Gore
campaign message).
52. Philip Shenon, The Nation: The Color of Money; Is Green the One that Counts the Most?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Cedric Muhammad, The CongressionalBlack Caucus'and the Black Electorate's Campaign
Finance Dilemma, BLACKELECTORATE.COM, May 10, 2001, http://www.blackelectorate.com/
articles.asp?ID=30.
55. See Bruce A. Dixon, Muzzling the African American Agenda with Black Help: The DLC's
Corporate Dollars of Destruction, BLACK COMMENTATOR, June 12, 2003,
http://www.blackcommentator.com/46/46_cover.html (calling President Clinton's welfare reform
"more punitive than anything Reagan-era Republicans could have wrested from the Congress"). For
a discussion of the myriad and misguided ways in which President Clinton's Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 departs from past welfare policy, see Matthew
Diller, Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & POL' Y REV.
19, 25-30 (1998).
56. Smith, supra note 50, at 1518.
57. Id. at 1510-11.
[Vol. 57: 735
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in McConnell v. FEC.5s The contribution and spending patterns from the 2004
election cycle suggest the expectations that BCRA-banned soft money would
simply be replaced by other forms of soft money were, at least in part, apocryphal.
Although contributions to 527 organizations increased significantly after BCRA's
enactment, 527 organizations failed to replace some $337 million in BCRA-banned
soft money.59 Thus, BCRA has been moderately successful in attaining its
purported objective.
BCRA and the debate that preceded its enactment were unapologetically
neglectful of minority interests. The Act's impact on minority voters and
politicians was nevertheless felt, and it elicited two characteristic responses
motivated by common concern but divergent in their remedy. Alarmed that 527
organizations, few of which are run by or for minorities, had demonstrated an
inability to motivate and organize minority voter turnout, Representative Albert
Wynn proposed the 527 Fairness Act.6' The Act would allow individuals to
contribute more money to federal parties and candidates during a two-year
campaign cycle with the presumed objective of giving them a greater role in GOTV
efforts.62 However, Donna Brazile, Vice President Al Gore's 2000 campaign
manager, called for the creation of new sources of funding for minority electoral
58. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The court found "substantial evidence" to support Congress's ban of soft
money contributions to political parties. Id. at 154. The court upheld BCRA's prohibition on the
contribution of soft dollars to state and local party committees to finance federal election activity
because Congress reasonably concluded that the national parties would re-direct "soft-money
contributors to the state committees, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these
contributors as they had been to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties." Id. at
161-65. The court upheld BCRA's restrictions on national, state, and local party committees' ability
to direct funds to tax-exempt and Section 527 organizations on the finding that these committees would
"mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses ... into the service of like-minded tax-exempt
organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates." Id. at 174-75. The Court upheld
BRCA's ban on the raising and soliciting of soft money by federal officeholders and candidates. Id. at
181-82. The Court sustained BRCA's ban on state and local officeholders and candidates from using
soft money to support or oppose a federal candidate. Id. at 184-85. BCRA addressed the use of soft
money by corporations and labor unions to run issue advocacy ads by prohibiting these entities from
using their general treasuries to fund communications that have the intent or effect of influencing the
outcome of federal elections. Id. at 132. The Court upheld the broad definition of "electioneering
communication" that triggers the latter restriction. Id. at 189-94. The Court vitiated the express
advocacy/issue advocacy distinction and held Congress is not limited to regulating only the former. Id.
at 190-94.
59. Steve Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527 Groups, in THE ELECTION AFTER
REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT (Michael J. Malbin ed.)
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.cfinst.org/studieslElectionAfterReform/pdf/
EAR_527Chapter.pdf.
60. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 50, at 1509-19 (discussing how BCRA inordinately focused on
soft money while allowing substantial increases in hard, or regulated, contributions by wealthy
individuals and noting black candidates have the most difficulty raising hard dollars, which constitute
the majority of money raised by congressional candidates).
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activity that would "allow for more independence from the major two political
parties. '6 3 Brazile's suggestion is far more systemic.
Even the most egalitarian of campaign finance systems will require financial
agency on the part of minorities. Arizona's public finance system, the Arizona
1998 Citizens Clean Election Act,' has been shown to increase the number of
contributions and to diversify the economic strata from which contributions come.65
Expenditure limitations, a re-emergent frontier of campaign finance reform,
portends an expansion of citizen participation as well. In Landell v. Sorrell,66 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld Vermont's
expenditure limitations in state legislative and executive elections, in part on the
justification that, absent an expenditure cap, candidates and officeholders will allow
fundraising activities to plunder their time to the detriment of performing legislative
duties and engaging voters on issues. 67 That argument has a patina reminiscent of
a different line of First Amendment cases involving government employees' right
to engage in free speech in and about the workplace.68 Courts have balanced that
right against a government employer's interest in the efficient operation of its
office. 69 Voters are employers of those whom they elect to office and certainly have
as strong an interest in the efficient operations of legislative and executive offices
as do other government employers of their bailiwick.
Still, even in light of the increased democratization effected by public finance,
and even if expenditure limitations are upheld on one theory or another, these
reforms only address the candidate-finance component of the electoral process.
What if no candidate will forthrightly address the concerns of minority voters?
Minority voters must be financially prepared to take their own concerns to the
electorate and to not merely rely on candidate agency and all its vagaries.
Moreover, reforms must coexist with a political culture in which corporate media
often plays a role in anointing frontrunners and marginalizing black candidacies.7"
Reliance on white media for the promotion of a minority political agenda is even
less wise than reliance on white candidates. Ongoing reform, in sum, facilitates
equality but is no substitute for agency.
63. Id.
64. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-940 to -960 (Supp. 2005).
65. See COLOR OF MONEY REPORT, supra note 22, at 2, 11-13.
66. 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom., Vt. Republican State Comm. v. Sorrell,
126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
67. Id. at 124-25.
68. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist.
205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
69. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
70. See, e.g., The Issues: Sharpton: Going the Distance with Low Finance, BLACK
COMMENTATOR, May 1, 2003, http://www.blackcommentator.com/40/40_issues.html (discussing
corporate media's devaluing of A] Sharpton's presidential campaign); see also Laura Washington,
Editorial, Conventional Wisdom a Crock in Guv Race, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 4,2002, at 31 (reporting
that black gubernatorial candidate Roland Burris believed that white-owned media were over-
emphasizing his race and marginalizing his background as a statewide elected official).
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IV. A PRESCRIPTION FOR SELF-HELP
Equating inequality with a lack of agency is easy, particularly when the
inequities are as stark as they are between black and white Americans. The black
unemployment rate is more than double that of whites, and the gap is wider than it
was in 1972."1 The income gap between black and white families has increased
since 1968, with black families now making only 58 percent of the typical white
family's income.72 In 2001, the typical black household possessed only 16 percent
of the net worth of the median white household ($19,000 versus $121,000).7' These
are but a few of the despairing statistics that discredit assertions, such as Bradley
Smith's, that if certain viewpoints are not being heard, it is not due to inequality but
rather because they lack popular electoral support. 74 The black agenda is shunned
in the national discourse for fear of alienating white voters,75 and it defies earthly
reason to argue that blacks' relative socioeconomic disadvantage does not handicap
their ability to promote that agenda.
But disadvantage should not be conflated with dependency. Even as economic
unequals, and even if only on unequal terms, minorities have the capacity to
exercise agency-to engage the campaign finance system on independent terms.
A principal impediment to minorities' exercise of agency, however, is consumerism.
Black and Latino consumerism transfers money to many of the interests that oppose
a minority political agenda. Although this paradoxical consequence may be
inevitable in an economy in which minorities by and large do not own the means of
production,76 there is no reason for voters of color to enrich others while failing to
invest in their own political capital.
The Selig Center for Economic Growth at the University of Georgia pegs
African Americans' 2005 disposable income at $761 billion and estimates it will
grow to $1 trillion in 2010."7 The comparable figures for Latinos are $736 billion
in spending power in 2005, and $1.087 trillion in 2010.78 Some will be tempted to
misuse this data to suggest minority economic inequality is the result of profligate
71. DEDRICK MUHAMMAD ET AL., THE STATE OF THE DREAM 2004: ENDURING DISPARITIES IN
BLACKANDWHITE 1 (2004), available at http://faireconomy.org/press/2004/StateoftheDream2OO4.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance,
86 GEO. L.J. 45, 70 (1997).
75. See Terry Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 845, 852, 870
(2000).
76. Although minorities constitute 28 percent of the United States population, they compose only
15 percent of all businesses. Shera Dalin, Study Outlines Strategies for Minorities Entrepreneurs, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 29, 2005, at D3. "Minority firms account for less than 3 percent of all
business revenue." Id.
77. Jeffrey M. Humphreys, The Multicultural Economy 2005: American's Minority Buying
Power, 65 GA. Bus. ECON. CONDITIONS 1, 3 (2005), available at http://www.selig.uga.edu/forecast/
GBEC/GBEC053Q.pdf.
78. Id. at 6-7.
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spending habits. But consumptive behavior cannot explain the systemic differences
between minorities and whites in household wealth and other indicators.79 What the
data plausibly suggests, however, is that diversion of even a fraction of a percentage
of minority disposable income for political purposes would constitute a formidable
sum. The new sources of funding for greater political independence to which
Donna Brazile aspires already exist-minorities, while neither wealthy nor
economically equal, can aggregate small amounts to create such sources.
Creating the mentality and infrastructure necessary to realize this vision is
difficult but not insurmountable. Parting with even a nominal sum of money will
require not simply a renewed appreciation of the power of politics but a critical
understanding of the value of an investment in politics relative to, say, an
incremental consumer good. The corporate competition for minorities' disposable
income has become multiculturally targeted.8" The plea for political dollars takes
place against this backdrop as well as against a puzzling notion that economics, not
politics, matters. The wealth transfers conferred by the federal tax code alone
should readily silence the latter rhetoric.8' Convincing voters of color of the value
of an investment in politics in lieu of consumer spending is difficult precisely
because the worth of politics should be apparent from the harm they incur when
they disengage. How many police brutality incidents under Mayor Rudolph
Guiliani were necessary before black and Latino voters understood the importance
of who controls the police force?82 How many more conservative judges-who
usually, if not systematically, rule against minority interests, such as in
discrimination claims"3-must occupy a seat on the federal bench before minority
voters recognize that who wins the presidency and which party controls the Senate
determine what kind of justice they receive from our courts? Politics is at least as
important as the next lottery ticket purchase and is far more likely to have a direct
79. See id. at 4 (attributing spending habits of blacks to their lower per capita income and wealth
rather than attributing the latter to the former); Rod Watson, Social Policy? Stereotypes Are Simpler,
BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 21, 2004, at B I (citing authorities who conclude that the legacy of United
States social policy and discrimination account for the wealth gap between minorities and whites).
80. Doreen Hemlock, Companies Find Profit in Focus on Minorities, SUN-SENTINEL (FORT
LAUDERDALE, FL.), Oct. 8, 2004, at 1D.
81. See generally, DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG
OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH-AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 2 (2003) (arguing that
"our tax system now levies the poor, the middle class and even the upper middle class to subsidize the
rich").
82. Police abuse complains rose in New York by forty-four percent between 1990 and 1999, a
period encompassing most of Guiliani's tenure as mayor. See City of N.Y., Civilian Complaint Review
Bd., Semiannual Status Report: January-June 2000, at 22 (Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbsemi2000.pdf.
83. See, e.g., Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of the
1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 268-70
(2005) (presenting data that reveals a correlation between the increase in federal judges appointed by
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impact on minority voters' lives. A massive re-education project to convey this
reality is essential.
The funding for the creation of a financial infrastructure for an independent
minority campaign finance vehicle has been the source of some debate. Some have
called for the creation of a black progressive PAC, the seed money for which would
come from white progressive PACs and 527 organizations, after which the start-up
organization would become independent.84 This approach is consistent with the
notion that white progressives and the Democratic Party should not be able to rely
on overwhelming black support without providing that community with tangible
benefits. One potential refinement of the proposal would modify the political
committee form that the proposal envisions. Political committees are subject to
contribution amount and source limitations as well as disclosure rules that 527
organizations currently are not.8 6 Given the current state of the law, a 527
organization may be preferable to a PAC, allowing the black fundraising conduit
to draw, for example, from like-minded black entertainers who could give more
generously than would be allowed to a PAC.
A corresponding tact would build on the preeminent role played by black
churches in minority communities by supporting pending legislation that would
protect a religious organization's tax-exempt status even when its leaders or
members express "personal views on political matters or elections for public office
during the religious service."8 Although the adoption of such legislation would not
allow a religious organization to convert is mission or directly engage in fundraising
for political purposes, its language would, for instance, inoculate a church whose
leader uses its services to endorse a black progressive PAC. In building an
infrastructure and donor base for an independent minority campaign finance
operation, drawing on existing institutions in the minority community is essential.
V. CONCLUSION
A full exposition of the myriad forms an independent operation could take is
the subject for another work. Yet the imperative of independence-of
agency-should be plain. There should not be another election cycle in which
grassroots community organizations are prevented from doing what they do best:
organizing minority voters. Nor should white business interests be empowered to
ordain minority legislative leaders. Minorities must wean themselves from other
peoples' money-money that those other people possess in part by virtue of dollars
spent by minority consumers-and begin to invest in their own political capital.
84. See Black Caucus Conservatives, supra note 40.
85. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 50, at 1521-22.
86. For a discussion of these distinctions and proposed legislative and regulatory changes, see
Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem... and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 949,
950-52 (2005).
87. H.R. 235, 109th Congress (2005).
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